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Abstract. Privacy technological threatens are no limited to data pro-
tection. Social Network Applications (SNA) and ubiquitous computing 
or Ambient Intelligence face other privacy risks. The business model 
of SNA and the improvement of data mining allow social computation. 
SNA regulation should favor privacy-by-design and Privacy Enhanc-
ing Technologies (PET). Default friendly-privacy policies should also 
be adopted. The data portability of the applications shifts SNA into 
a new field of ubiquitous computing. Therefore, the solutions of the 
Ambient Intelligence shoud be also analysed in the context of SNA.
Keywords: Social Network Applications, Privacy, Privacy Enhan-
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1. Major Privacy Concerns
1.1. Control
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is willingly provided by users of 
Social Networks Applications (SNA). So one of the major privacy concerns is 
the lack of self-control over these data. In fact, the business model of the SNA 
consists of exploiting the value of users’ PII. A recent study gives us a more 
precise idea of the amount of PII introduced in the SNA (Fogel, Nehmad, 2009). 
More than three-quarter of students have created a social networking profile 
in Facebook, and about one-half in MySpace. The average years for the profile 
displayed was 1.9 years. With regard to a daily visit to one’s profile, the aver-
age was 2.4 times. Other profiles were viewed on average 4 times. Concerning 
daily hours spent viewing profiles, the average was 1 h. The average number 
of ‘‘friends” on profiles was 239. Almost three-quarter allowed anyone to view 
their profile without restricting views to those specifically accepted. Almost 
10% included their phone number and home address on their profile.
1.  This study is within the frame of the funded research project “Freedom of speech In the Context 
Of Web 2.0 and Social Networks: Redefinition, Guarantees and Limits”, Cotino as main resear-
cher. Ministry of Science and Innovation (DER2009-14519-C05-01).e
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The “News feed” and “Beacon” features in Facebook are interesting exam-
ples of control concerns. Facebook released the News Feed feature on Septem-
ber 5, 2006. The feature culls new PII that users post on their personal profile 
pages and delivers it to the website’s initial page (Hoadley, C. M. et al., 2009): 
for instance, ‘‘Alice’s status changed from ‘single’ to ‘in a relashionship’.” Fa-
cebook indicated that it would make new information easier than ever to find. 
In response to the widespread concerns, Facebook immediately took down the 
News Feed applications and worked nonstop for two days on providing a wider 
variety of privacy preferences. Then Facebook re-released the News Feed ap-
plications with new privacy control features. On September 8, 2006, Facebook’s 
CEO, Mr. Zuckerberg, apologized for this privacy outcry and said: ‘‘this was a 
big mistake on our part, and I’m sorry for it. . . But apologizing isn’t enough. I 
wanted to make sure we did something about it, and quickly. So we have been 
coding nonstop for two days to get you better privacy controls.”
With News Feed, no new information was revealed; users could only see 
changes of their friends’ pages. So, why were users so uncomfortable with it? 
A plausible explanation is that the new interface offered lesser levels of per-
ceived control over PII (Xu, H., 2009). One possible conclusion is that privacy 
concerns can be lessened by offering more control functions: first of all, control 
of PII disclosure; but also control access to disclosed information. With News 
Feed, obtaining information about other users was easier, which leads to a 
lower perception of control.
1.2. Transparency
Online privacy policies are difficult to understand. Most privacy policies re-
quire an ability to decode legalistic, confusing, or jargon-laden phrases. Privacy 
researchers and industry groups have thus devised several standardized privacy 
policy formats to help people compare policies (McDonald, A.M. et al., 2009).
Another helpful tool that shows what a user is sharing with whom is Face-
book’s profile preview tool2. Go to Settings’ Privacy Settings, then Profile, and 
type a friend’s name in the box on the top. You will see your profile as that 
friend would view it, and then you can adjust your privacy settings accordingly 
(Larkin, 2009). 
1.3. Unauthorized use
Facebook states that it will do everything possible to protect the informa-
tion posted on the site but “cannot and do not guarantee that User Content you 
post on the Site will not be viewed by unauthorized persons” (Facebook, 2009). 
Indeed, we will see later that other users or even non-users can accede and use 
PII most of the time from SNA users.
2.  Other interesting tools for Facebook users at Nick O’Neill’s “10 Privacy Settings Every Facebook 
User Should Know”, www.allfacebook.com/2009/02/facebookprivacy.
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2. Legal Framework
2.1. Data protection regulation
Data protection regulations are considered by some authors as a reference 
basis for the development of methodologies tailored to design privacy-aware 
systems (Guarda, Zannone, 2009). The first step is to summarize the privacy 
principles:
 (1)   Fair and Lawful Processing: the collection and processing of personal 
data shall neither unreasonably intrude upon the data subjects’ priva-
cy nor unreasonably interfere with their autonomy and integrity, and 
shall be compliant with the overall legal framework.
 (2)   Consent: personal data shall be collected and processed only if the data 
subject has given his explicit consent to their processing.
 (3)   Purpose Specification: personal data shall be collected for specified, 
lawful and legitimate purposes and shall not be processed in any way 
incompatible with the purposes for which data have been collected.
 (4)   Minimality: the collection and processing of personal data shall be li-
mited to the minimum necessary for achieving the specific purpose. 
This includes that personal data shall be retained only for the time 
necessary to achieve the specific purpose.
 (5)   Minimal Disclosure: the disclosure of personal data to third parties 
shall be restricted and only occur upon certain conditions.
 (6)   Information Quality: personal data shall be accurate, relevant, and 
complete with respect to the purposes for which they are collected and 
processed.
 (7)   Data Subject Control: the data subject shall be able to check and in-
fluence the processing of his personal data.
 (8)   Sensitivity: the processing of personal data, data which are particu-
larly sensitive for the data subject, shall be subject to more stringent 
protection measures than other personal data.
 (9)   Information Security: personal data shall be processed guaranteeing a 
level of security appropriate to the risks presented by the processing 
and the nature of the data (Guarda, Zannone, 2009).
2.2. Recommendations
Up to now, one report of 2008 is perhaps the most relevant legal frame-
work on WBSN and privacy (“Rome Memorandum”). One key legal preliminary 
consideration is that there are only very few rules governing the publication 
of personal data at the initiative of private individuals. This is due to the fact 
that it had not been a major issue in the real world, and it has been only rel-
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evant on the Internet with WBSN. Another sociological key element is that a 
new generation of “digital natives” has appeared, and they seem more comfort-
able with publishing (sometimes intimate) details of their lives on the Internet. 
The Rome Memorandum recommendations to regulators are:
– Introduce the option of a right to pseudonymous use.
–  Ensure that service providers are honest and clear about what informa-
tion is required for the basic service. Specific problems exist with consent 
of minors.
– Obligation to data breach notification for social network services. 
–  Possibly attributing more responsibility to WBSN providers for personal 
data content on WBSN.
–  Improve integration of privacy issues and tools into the educational sys-
tem.
Another interesting document is the European Network and Information 
Security Agency Position Paper 1. Some of the recommendations are:
–  WBSN should, where possible, use contextual information to educate 
people in ‘real-time’.
–  Awareness-raising campaigns should also be directed at software develo-
pers to encourage security conscious development practices and corpora-
te policy.
–  The regulatory framework governing WBSN should be reviewed and, 
where necessary, revised: 
 •  What is the legal position on deletion of user generated content by 
service providers if it is classed as WBSN spam?
 •  What is the legal position on image-tagging by third parties?
 •  Who is responsible for security flaws resulting from user-generated 
markup or scripting?
 •  How should privacy policies of embedded third party widgets be com-
municated to users?
 • What exactly constitutes personal data in a WBSN environment?
 • What is the legal position on profile-squatting?
 •  Should the posting of certain classes of data by minors (location data) 
be made illegal?
–  Users should be given accurate information on what is done with their 
data before and after account closure. WBSN should be used in a con-
trolled and open way (i.e. not banned or discouraged) with co-ordinated 
campaigns to educate students, teachers and parents.
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Recently, we can mention the Working Paper nº163 of the article 29 Group 
dealing with online social communities, June 12, 20093. This study considers 
that the European Directive of data protection covers also the SNA scenario: 
“The new aspects of this recommendation are perhaps the reference to se-
curity tools and “privacy-friendly” default settings. For the first time, a recom-
mendation mentions Privacy Enhancing Technologies as a solution, even if 
limited to the problem of the privacy of young users.”
2.3. Beyond data protection 
But privacy cannot be limited to the data protection regulation. The Ger-
man Constitutional Court published a decision in February 2008. This deci-
sion constitutes a new “basic right to the confidentiality and integrity of infor-
mation-technological systems” as part of the general personality and privacy 
rights in the German constitution4. The ruling explains the relevance of using 
information-technological systems for the expression of personality. These sys-
tems are defined as technological tools that “alone or in their technical inter-
connectedness can contain PII of the affected person in a scope and multiplicity 
such that access to the system makes it possible to get insight into relevant 
parts of the conduct of life of a person or even gather a meaningful picture of 
the personality”. Weiss considers that this description could be easily applied 
to social network profile data (Weiss, 2009).
3. Privacy Preserving Tools and Procedures
3.1. SNA need new PETs
At least, the ISO has achieved consensus on four components of privacy as 
follows (Wright et al., 2009):
–  Anonymity ensures that a subject may use a resource or service without 
disclosing user identity.
–  Pseudonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service without 
disclosing identity, but can still be accountable for that use.
–  Unlinkability ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or 
services without others being able to link these uses together.
3.  Opinion 5/2009, on online social networking, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2009_en.htm
4.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 from 2008-02-27, paragraph (1–333), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidun-
gen/rs20080227 1bvr037007.html.
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–  Unobservability ensures that a user may use a resource or service wi-
thout others, especially third parties, being able to observe that the re-
source or service is being used5. 
General Privacy Enhancing technologies, like anonymity, pseudonymity, 
and access management are useful for surfing the Internet. Nevertheless, SNA 
do not seem a priority because the increasing of the PII is at the core of busi-
ness model. This a major problem for PeerSoN, a decentralised SNA based on 
Peer-to-Peer (Buchegger et al.). More, privacy in SNA can not be considered as 
data protection, and thus be limited to access control and processing of data. 
Anonymity is not completely abandoned (Kacimi et al., 2009) and access control 
can be managed with semantic web framework (Carminati et al., 2009). We 
can also adapt interesting cryptographic solutions to Facebook (Lucas, Bori-
sov, 2008). The main aim of cryptographic solutions is to what extent a user 
can ensure his privacy while benefiting from existing online services. NOYB 
is a novel approach that provides privacy while preserving some of the func-
tionality provided by online services (Guha et al., 2008). The identity manage-
ment can also be improved by reputation systems adapted to SNA, which are 
platforms of several online communities linked such as Facebook (Pingel and 
Steinbrecher, 2008).
However, SNA need new PETs focused on transparency, automatic compli-
ance assurance functions and proactive communications techniques on risks 
(Weiss, S., 2009). 
3.2. Transparency
The complete transparency and control of the usage of the user’s PII is 
only possible with privacy-by-design practices for designers and developers. 
PETs cannot be simply an added tool, but have to be incorporated at the first 
stages of the design or the application development. For instance, PriS is an 
engineering method which incorporates privacy requirements early in the sys-
tem development process (Kalloniatis et al., 2008). Privacy requirements are 
considered as organisational goals that need to be satisfied. PriS provides a 
description of the effect of privacy requirements on business processes, and it 
allows the identification of the best privacy-preserving system architecture. 
3.3. Default privacy settings
A recent study shows that while there is some use of privacy settings by 
SNA users now, there is still a significant portion of SNA users who have not 
5.  ISO/IEC 15408, Information technology – Security techniques –Evaluation criteria for IT secu-
rity, First edition, International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, 1999. The standard 
is also known as the Common Criteria.
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changed their permissive settings and allow unknown users to view private 
bits of information. SNA must clearly indicate the bare minimum of private 
information needed for a particular set of interactions (Krishnamurthy et al., 
2008). The default privacy settings should be the bare minimum. Furthermore, 
a privacy tool to identify the metrics bare minimum would be useful. It would 
also allow users to compare various SNA with a clear comparative element of 
analyses (Krishnamurthy et al., 2008).
Another aspect of the problem is helping a new user to identify suitable de-
fault privacy settings. An interesting tool allows a choice of default privacy set-
tings that have been learnt from a set of users’ privacy settings. This solution 
has the advantage that users can easily understand and modify these settings 
to specify their desired initial policy (Ravichandran et al., 2008).
The adoption of a sort of proactive communication would be also useful. In-
deed, there should be options for the user to easily report privacy invasions.
4. New challenges: Data Portability
Data mining and screen scrapping applications automatically infer real-
word connections, and discover communities and individuals. Indeed, identi-
fying consumer preferences is a key challenge in customizing electronic com-
merce sites to individual users. People linked in SNA often share preferences, 
allowing inference of interest in products based on knowledge of a consumer’s 
network friends and their interests (Hogg, T., 2009). SNA operators should 
also be aware of the importance of not only protecting user profile data, but 
the structure of the social graph. In September 2007, Facebook started making 
public search listings available to those not logged in to the site to encourage 
visitors to join the SNA. A recent study concludes that they should not assist 
data aggregators by giving away public listings because it allows data retriev-
al. (Bonneau et al., 2009). Another way of getting PII, particularly link privacy 
attack, uses the lookahead tool that indicates the friends known by a user. A 
recent study suggests SNA not to limit the lookahead to 1 or 2, whenever possi-
ble (Korolova et al., 2009). An extreme use of SNA, the so-called Antisocial Net-
works, are distributed systems based on social networking Websites that can 
be exploited by attackers and aimed at carrying out network attacks (Athana-
sopoulos, 2008). These examples are external discovery or disuse of PII.
The problem comes also from the inside. PII data from SNA have more and 
more applications to run with or “mash up” applications. In fact, a recent study 
found that about 90% of the top 150 Facebook applications get access to PII 
which should not be allowed to manage (Felt, Evans, 2007). Some possible pri-
vacy improvements in Facebook: one Facebook user can see the applications he 
has currently authorized going to Settings-Application Settings (Larkin, 2009). 
If a friend installs an application, the program will be able by default to see 
anything a user has shared with that friend. To restrict the data available, a 
user can go to Settings-Privacy Settings and click the Applications link. Then, 
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he can click the Settings tab on the top, and deselect any checked boxes on that 
page for info he doesn’t want to be shared. These settings only affect the ap-
plications his friends have installed. Afterwards he has to choose Authorized 
from the ‘Show’ drop-down menu (Larkin, 2009).
Google announced the adoption of standards such as Friend-Of-A-Friend 
(FOAF) and XHTML Friends Network (XFN) in their OpenSocial application 
to give access to the developers to the network graph, i.e. the map of connec-
tions between friends. This is data portability based on known standards, but 
in many cases there is no standard guidelines in the process. 
That is the reason why Weiss proposes a privacy threat model for SNA 
portability (Weiss, 2009): 
•  Information privacy needs to be controlled on the data (PII) level.
•   The user needs to be able to determine the sensitivity and context of 
the PII provided. 
This seems a major challenge when we read about impressive tools such 
as CenceMe. CenceMe injects sensing presence into popular social network-
ing applications such as Facebook, MySpace, and IM (Skype, Pidgin) allowing 
new levels of “connection” and implicit communication (albeit non-verbal) be-
tween friends in social networks. Sensing presence captures a user’s status in 
terms of his activity (e.g., sitting, walking, meeting friends), disposition (e.g., 
happy, sad, doing OK), habits (e.g., at the gym, coffee shop today, at work) and 
surroundings (e.g., noisy, hot, bright, high ozone) (Miluzzo et al., 2009). An 
interesting solution for the context problem is DroPicks (Hosio et al., 2007). 
The context is defined by the fact that many everyday artefacts are immobile, 
which implicitly restricts contents stored in a location. Such indirect, contex-
tual sharing has advantages over direct communication mechanisms (E-mail, 
SMS, IM...).
• Privacy-preserving data portability can only work if the user can earmark 
the PII provided with individual privacy preferences.
In order to respect individual privacy preferences, the user self-control and 
the ease of public accessibility, further research is announced on semantic 
technologies for tagging data for context and purpose, transparency-enhancing 
technologies and Digital Rights Management (Weiss, 2009). 
5. Future Trends: Privacy and Ubiquitous Computing
The deployment of ubiquitous computing casts doubt on the extent to which 
privacy is legally protected in public spaces (De Hert et al., 2009). In case law, 
the European Court of Human Rights has introduced the notion of ‘‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’’. But ubiquitous computing is turning the reasonable 
expectation of privacy into an expectation of being monitored. Furthermore, 
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pervasive computing needs as many data as possible which clearly clashes 
with some of the main principles of data protection law. For instance, the data 
minimisation principle, collecting as little data as necessary, and the purpose 
specification principle only use the collected information for the purpose de-
fined at the moment of data collection (De Hert et al., 2009).
With the emergence of Ambient Intelligence or pervasive computing, the 
definition of personal data needs to be reconsidered (Wright et al., 2009). Moreo-
ver, the distinction between personal and other data in a ubiquitous computing 
world is difficult to maintain. Perhaps it is time to data protection tout court. 
Indeed, the definition of personal data more and more implies the necessity of 
a case-by-case assessment, an approach upheld in a recent opinion from the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the definition of personal data6. 
With ubiquitous computing, a new net, the Internet of things, will link many 
“anonymous” data to persons. Therefore, a lot of data mining and analyses will 
follow. As a result, all data will be personal data (Wright et al., 2009). In fact, 
in many cases it would not be even necessary to identify an individual in order 
to conduct commercially profitable operations. The unique identifier will be 
enough for intrusive marketing, for instance. So instead of identifiability as a 
criterion, privacy relevant data should rather be all those that can be used to 
affect our behaviour and decisions (Wright et al.).
Another important issue is the transparency of the processing. According 
to data protection regulation, data collectors and data processors should indi-
cate the user which data are collected and give him or her basic information 
about the data processing. Nowadays, the user has not a comprehensive view 
of the data processing and its implications. In any event, such an information 
requirement might be unworkable with the generalization of the ubiquitous 
computing (Wright et al., 2009). What will become important in the context 
of SNA is the profiling knowledge, that is to say the access to the profile. This 
information could make comprehensible why the environment takes some ac-
tions, and could even help to prove liability in case of damage (Wright et al., 
2009). On the other hand, anonymity can also be a useful tool with mobile com-
munity services (Demestichas, K. et al., 2009). PETs could provide important 
factual means of transparency. Transparency-enhancing technologies (TETs) 
could contribute to information exchange and management. An example of a 
TET is the so-called ‘‘sticky policies’’, which stick to or follow data as they are 
disseminated7. Sticky policies would provide clear information and indicate to 
data processors and controllers which privacy policy applies to the data con-
cerned (De Hert et al., 2009).
6.  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on data protection issues related 
to RFID technology, 10107/05/EN, WP 105, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/
docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf.
7.  Hildebrandt M, Meints M (eds) (2006) RFID, profiling, and AmI, FIDIS (Future of Identity in 
the Information Society) Deliverable D7.7. http://www.fidis.net
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The privacy concern about cloud computing can be a good analogy. As cloud 
services process users’ data on machines that the users do not own or operate, 
recommended privacy practices for developers are welcome (Pearson, 2009):
1.  Minimise personal information sent to and stored in the cloud
2.  Protect personal information in the cloud
3.  Maximise user control
4.  Allow user choice
5.  Specify and limit the purpose of data usage
6.  Provide feedback
Particularly, for mobile, ubiquitous social awareness applications, other 
complementary principles are (Raento, Oulasvirta, 2008):
1.  Support lightweight permissions
2.  Assume reciprocity
3.  Make it possible to appear differently to different people
4.  Allow for commenting, modifying and framing automatic disclosure
5.  Provide for feedback
6.  Allow the user to lie
7.  Do not take control away from the user
8.  Allow opportunistic use
9.  Do not try to do everything within the system
In any case, Ambient Intelligence, or ubiquitous computing, requires a 
shift to privacy-by-design and PETs (Wright et al., 2009). Regulatory authori-
ties and/or industry leaders could usefully encourage or formalise this option. 
Some research consortia, under the European Commission 6th Framework Pro-
gramme, are good examples8.
6. Conclusion
No single measure will adequately respond to the challenges to privacy 
posed by SNA and the ubiquitous Information Society. In fact, some combi-
nation of measures will be needed (Wright et al., 2009). Privacy principles, 
like Fair Information Principles (FIPs) or data protection principles are not 
enough. Perhaps, we are witnessing the very first stages of an important shift: 
the proportionality and transparency can wide the traditional data protection 
8.  Some deliverables are DISCREET Deliverable 2402, March 2008, http://www.ist-discreet.org/ 
and SPICE Deliverable 1.8, May 2008. http:// www.ist-spice.org/nav/deliverables.htm.
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principles. But, if we want to face to new possibilities of data portability or 
ubiquitous computing, we have also to encourage the adoption of PETs and 
TETs. Furthermore, this has to be done with privacy-by-design practices and 
not in a second moment of the implementation. We can go on indicating how 
these changes are transforming the privacy right, but perhaps it is time now 
to analyse and offer concrete solutions to concrete SNA. This should require a 
deep study of the privacy policies of a concrete SNA, and work together in the 
design of future applications, adopted with privacy-by-design practices.
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